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* The author was a participant on the "Reactions from Industry" panel at the March 29, 2008
Symposium on Bessen and Meurer's book PATENT FAILURE: HOwJUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK, sponsored by the University of Georgia School of Law, the
Department of Economics of the University of Georgia Terry College of Business, and the
University of Georgia Research Foundation. The author is the former general counsel of Eastman
Kodak Company where he was a senior vice president and member of the Board of Directors. He
is currently a senior advisor at Cornerstone Research, an economic and financial consulting firm.
The views expressed herein are the author's, and should not be attributed to Eastman Kodak or to
Cornerstone Research. The comments are largely drawn from the author's own experience and
should not be interpreted as a scholarly treatment of the subject. On the other hand, the author was
employed for over thirty years in industry by an innovator company (Eastman Kodak) that was an
active participant in the United States patent system and believes, rightly or wrongly, that his
experiences can offer insight into the domestic patent system's impact on innovation and innovators
in the United States.
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AUTHOR'S ADDENDUM AND ERRATA
In Footnote 25 on page 63, add the following additional citation:
"See also Polaroidv. Eastman Kodak, 519 F.Supp. 381 (DC Mass 1981) holding Polaroid's U.S.
Patent No. 3,761,289 invalid for obviousness under the patentability standards prevailing at the
time."
In Footnote 109 on page 79, in the second line, change "searching" to "secondary."
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I. INTRODUCTION
The plan for this Article is to provide an overall comment regarding PATENT
FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT
RISK,' then to provide topical comments for specific items that caught my eye,
and, finally, to conclude with my own prescriptions for patent reforms to foster
innovation. Again, I emphasize that the comments and the reform prescriptions
are drawn from my own experience, are not a scholarly critique, and may well
overlook important points.
II. OVERALL COMMENT
My overall reaction to the book is that its conclusion is sound. The United
States patent system is not working for most of its participants. And it is certainly
not working for most innovators-those who provide products and services to
American consumers, make investments, and take business risks to do so. Nor
is it working for American consumers who ultimately bear the costs of the United
States patent system. However, I believe Bessen and Meurer's diagnosis misses
the mark to some extent. The current problems with the United States patent
system cannot all be shoehorned into the imperfect notice basket. There is
already clear notice of the Federal Circuit's lowered and less certain standards for
patentability that result in valid patents on obvious inventions and their damages
rules that result in excessive patent damages awards.' So, prescriptions to solve
the notice problems, even if adopted, will not address these more serious
problems or make the United States patent system an engine for innovation. At
the end of my comments, I will outline my own views about needed reforms.
The great question, which is beyond the scope of the book, is the extent to
which patents are necessary, if at all, for innovation. We do know that innovation
depends on the absence of patents owned by others than the innovator that affect
IJAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOWJUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
2 See Cecil D. Quillen, Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. LAW &BUS. REV. 207,210-25
(2006) (explaining major changes affecting innovation in the United States brought about by the
Federal Circuit). The lowered standards for patentability imposed by the Federal Circuit may be
ameliorated, at least to some extent, if the Federal Circuit and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) follow the restored higher standards for patentability prescribed by the
Supreme Court in KSR Int'l Co. v. Telelex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). It remains to be seen the
extent to which that occurs. So far, however, the Supreme Court has not taken a case that addresses
the unnecessary uncertainty as to patent validity imposed by Federal Circuit decisions, nor has it
taken a case that addresses any of the several Federal Circuit decisions that have resulted in excessive
damages awards.
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the innovation, or at least the ability for the innovator to obtain licenses under
such others' patents.3
But what about the innovator? To what extent, if any, is patent ownership by
the innovator essential for innovation? Although that question is beyond the
scope of the book, there are hints at the answer.4 The authors report a study by
Moser who found that only 11.1% of British and 15.3% of United States
innovations exhibited at the 1851 fair at the Crystal Palace in London were
patented.' They also report a 1998 survey study of European firms by Arundel
and Kabla6 who found that only 35.9% of product innovations by the surveyed
firms and 24.8% of their process innovations were patented. The clear
implication is that patents owned by the innovator were unimportant for at least
the 88.9% of British innovations and the 84.7% of the United States innovations
exhibited at the 1841 fair that were not patented. And for the surveyed European
firms the implications are similar: patents owned by the surveyed firms were
unimportant for at least the 64.1% of their product innovations and the 75.2% of
their process inventions that were not patented. This is a fertile area for more
research. If in fact patents owned by innovators are only infrequently important
for innovation and patents owned by others than the innovator can be
impediments to innovation, then the policy suggestion is that a patent system that
fosters innovation requires high standards for patentability that result in fewer
marginal patents to impede innovation.
3 See Quillen, supra note 2, at 223-25 (discussing the "patent thicket" caused by increased patent
issuance).
' The question was asked by Professor Mansfield of 100 randomly selected firms to ascertain
the percentage of their inventions commercially introduced in 1981-1983 that would not have been
commercialized if patent protection could not have been obtained. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and
Innovation: An EpiriealStudy, 32 MGMT. SC. 173, 174 (1986). He found that patent protection was
judged essential for fewer than thirty percent of commercialized inventions for all surveyed
industries except for chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Patents were judged essential for only thirty
percent ofchemical innovations and for sixty-five percent of pharmaceutical innovations. Thus, with
the exception of the pharmaceutical industry, patents owned by innovators were unimportant for
seventy percent or more of their innovations. Id at 175; see also Edwin Mansfield, Patents, Innovation,
and U.S. Technology Pohg, 10 APLA Q.J. 35, 39-40 (1982) (finding similar results).
5 Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Eidence from Nineteenth-Centuy World
Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REv. 1214,1221 (2005). See also Petra Moser, Why Don't Inventors Patent? (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13294,2007), availabk at http://www.nber.org/pape
rs/w13294 (finding similar data).
6 Anthony Arundel & Isabelle Kabla, WhatPerrentage ofinnovations are Patented?EmpiricalEstimates
for European Firms, 27 REs. POL'Y 127, 132 (1998).
7 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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III. TOPICAL COMMENTS
In chapter one, the book notes that patent rights and patent litigation are
global matters; that important inventions are usually patented in all major markets;
and that "[t]his means that patent holders can choose where to litigate."8 Patent
holders do not have such unfettered choice. They can litigate only in countries
where an alleged infringement has occurred.9  Nonetheless, the authors'
conclusion that the United States is preferred by patent holders as a forum for
patent infringement litigation is probably correct given the size of United States
markets and the fact that standards for patentability in the United States are lower
than those in other major industrialized countries.' The lowered standards for
patentability in the United States in comparison to other industrialized nations
means that patents which are invalid or never would have been granted elsewhere
may well be valid and enforceable in the United States. This could explain why
patent owners should prefer the United States as a friendly forum for attempting
to enforce their patents.
In the context of what Bessen and Meurer call "inadvertent infringement," the
authors state that "[p]otential innovators consider not only the reward that they
might reap from owning patents, but also the risk of being sued for infringing
upon the patents of others."" If I understand this statement correctly, and I am
not sure that I do, it is not consistent with my own experience. At Kodak we
took great pains, not always successful, to avoid infringing upon valid patents of
others. So we certainly were cognizant of the risk that our innovations might
infringe upon patents of others, and that affected our decision as to whether to
8 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 5.
9 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 415
cmt. i (1987) (explaining territoriality of patents).
" See, e.g., Paul H. Jensen et al., Disharmony in International Patent Office Decisions, 15 FED. CIR.
B.J. 679, 689-90 (2006) (finding that only 72.5% of European Patent Office (EPO) applications
and 4 4.5 % ofJapanese Patent Office (PO) applications corresponding to a selection of about 70,000
United States patents were granted by the EPO and JPO, respectively); Smart J.H. Graham &
Dietmar Harhoff, Would the U.S. Benefitfrom Patent Post-grant Reviews? Evidence from a Twinning' Study,
(Ctr. for Int'l Bus. Educ. and Res. (CIBER)), Ga. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No. 2005/013-05-
06,2005), availabkeathttp://www.ciber.gatech.edu/workingpaper/2005/013-05-06.pdf (finding that
over thirty percent of litigated United States patents and forty percent of non-litigated U.S. patents
are not awarded patent protection in Europe); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
AND DEVELOPMENT PATENTS AND INNOVATION: TRENDS AND POLICY CHALLENGES 13 (2004),
availabeathttp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/12/24508541.pdf (finding that grant rates at the EPO
for patent applications with United States priorities were about thirty percent lower than in the
United States).
1 BESSEN & MEURER, sypra note 1, at 9.
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go forward with an innovation. 2 But, I do not recall a single instance from my
thirty years at Kodak in which we chose not to go forward with an innovation
because it was not patented by Kodak. The potential reward we might reap from
owning patents on our innovations was irrelevant to the decision of whether or
not to commercialize the innovation. Rather, that decision depended on the
robustness of the proposed innovation and whether it was clear of the patents of
others, not whether it was patented by Kodak. I suspect that is true of most
other companies whose business success depends on innovation.
Somewhat inconsistent with the authors' statement that potential innovators
consider "the risk of being sued for infringing upon the patents of others"' 3 is
their later statement that "[t]here is abundant evidence that many technology
firms... invest little in patent search and clearance."' 4 I do not know how one
can consider the risk of being sued for infringing upon the patents of others
without investing in patent search and clearance. In support of their statement
that many technology firms invest little in patent search and clearance, the authors
cite an Intellectual Property Owners survey in which the majority of those
surveyed disagreed with the statement: "We always do a patent search before
initiating any R&D [research and development] or product development effort."'"
The question confuses apples and oranges, and a negative answer is appropriate.
A patent search for clearance purposes prior to undertaking a R&D effort is
simply not possible. One does not have a clear idea of where the research might
lead, so a clearance search at that stage would be impossible. A state of the art
search might be appropriate, but not a clearance search. And even in the case of
a product (or process) development effort, a clearance search before the effort is
commenced is probably premature. A clearance search has to await definition of
the product (or process). Nonetheless, I think their conclusion is true for many
industries; especially in semiconductors, computers, and software, where the
complexity of the products and the number of patents and their vagueness make
the effort difficult to the point of impossibility. These industries simply wait for
patent problems to appear and then deal with them at the time. Or, they
accumulate large numbers of patents and enter into bilateral field of use cross
12 Recall that innovation, the commercialization of new products and processes, depends on the
absence of patents owned by others that affect the proposed innovation, or at least the ability to obtain
licenses under such others' patents. See supra Part II of this Article.
13 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 9.
14 Id. at 70.
15 Id. (citing Iain Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson, Survey Resultsfrom the 2003 IntelkctualPrpert2
Owners Association Survy on Strategic Management of Intellectual Property (2003), available at http://www.
ipo.org/articles).
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license agreements with their competitors that effectively abolish the patent
system between the parties to the agreements.
Additionally, there is the statement that "chemical and pharmaceutical firms
earn far more from their patents than they lose to litigation.' ' 16 Throughout the
book, chemical and pharmaceutical firms are frequently lumped together. That
is a bit misleading because my experience suggests that chemical and
pharmaceutical firms are quite different with respect to patents. For example, as
noted above, I believe that in most industries, including chemicals, the ownership
of patents by innovators is largely irrelevant to their commercialization
decisions."' But I doubt that is the case for the pharmaceutical industry, and I
suspect that work on many promising medications has been discontinued because
of the absence of available patent protection.' This may be a data problem in
which the two are lumped together in the available data and not a failure on the
part of the authors. But I would hope that in the future scholars in their analyses
would not indulge this assumption and would instead make a serious effort to
separate the two.
Furthermore, I hope scholars will try to separate the effects of "data
exclusivity" and the patent monopoly on pharmaceutical innovation. 9 Even if
one accepts that a monopoly subsidy is important for pharmaceutical innovation,
we should have some understanding of the relative importance of the two. For
example, if data exclusivity provides all of the monopoly incentive needed to
induce pharmaceutical innovation, then higher standards for patentability, which
are decidedly in the interest of other innovators, will not diminish pharmaceutical
innovation. It might even lead to the commercialization of some of those
promising medications that may have been dropped because of the absence of
available patent protection.
In chapter two, there is the statement: "A government agency, the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) must examine patent applications and will grant a patent
only if an invention is new, useful, non-obvious, and falls into one of the
appropriate subject-matter categories."" This is certainly an aspirational
statement for what the PTO should do, but it does not accord with the reality of
what the PTO actually does. Prior to the advent of the Federal Circuit, when the
16 Id. at 16.
17 Recall Professor Mansfield's finding that patent ownership by the innovator was unimportant
for seventy percent of chemical innovations. See supra note 4.
" Professor Mansfield found that patents were important for sixty-five percent of
pharmaceutical innovations. Id
" Data exclusivity for pharmaceutical innovations commercialized pursuant to an approved new
drug application is provided by 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(fi)-(fii) (West Supp. 2008).
20 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 32 (emphasis added).
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PTO was subject to the judicial supervision of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (one of the predecessor courts of the Federal Circuit), about two-thirds
of litigated patents for which there were appellate court validity decisions were
ruled invalid (i.e., for those patents, two-thirds of them did not conform to
applicable legal standards and should never have been granted by the PTO).2
Even today under the Federal Circuit's lowered standards for patentability, a
significant portion of litigated patents are ruled invalid and thus should never have
been granted by the PTO.'
Chapter three introduces what the authors characterize as "inadvertent
infringement" which, at least with regard to their discussion of Polaroid Corp. v.
Eastman Kodak Co.,23 stretches the term "inadvertent" beyond any commonly
understood meaning. The authors attribute the outcome of the Polaroid liability
case (Kodak lost) to the breakdown of the "patent notice function" which, for
Kodak, the authors described as the inability of a technology investor to
"unambiguously determine the scope and validity of a set of patents."24
This was not the reason at all. The "scope and validity" of the Polaroid
patents under the legal standards that existed in 1976 when Kodak's instant
photography products were introduced were easily (and unambiguously)
ascertained.2" No one knew at the time that the Federal Circuit would be created
in 1982, or that it would ignore long-standing law and immediately and drastically
lower the standards for patentability, judging decisions made in 1976 and earlier
by entirely different standards.2 6
21 GLORIA K. KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
ANALYSIS 4-23 (1980).
2 In a 1998 study of the 299 patents litigated to final validity decisions in 239 Federal Circuit
and District Court decisions from early 1989 through 1996, Allison and Lemley found that forty-six
percent were ruled invalid. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, EmpiricalEidence and the Va'do' of
Liigation Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).
' Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp. 828 (D. Mass. 1985) (deciding issues of
liability), aft, 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986), 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (D. Mass. 1990) (deciding
issues of damages), amended by 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711 (D. Mass. 1991).
24 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 51. The authors also confused the sequence of events
in the Polaroid litigation. They state that Kodak "paid Polaroid about $900 million and subsequently
exited the instant photography market." Id at 48. It was just the other way around. Kodak left the
instant photography business in 1986 in compliance with the injunction that became effective
following the Federal Circuit argument of Kodak's appeal of the liability decision. Polaroid Corp.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481,1534 (D. Mass. 1990). The damages settlement
for the $873 million judgment plus post-judgment interest was paid five years later in 1991. Polaroid
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711, 1714 (D. Mass. 1991).
s For the state of the law at the time, see generally Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); Sakraida v. Ag
Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
6 Frederic M. Scherer, The PokhicalEconoy of Patent Pokgy Reform in the United States (Kennedy
8
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The Hruska Commission Report delivered in 1975 emphatically recommended
against a specialist patent appeals court.2" Kodak's instant photography products
were introduced a year later in April 1976, contemporaneous with the Supreme
Court's decision in Sakraida v. Ag Pro."8 Kodak and its legal advisers took great
comfort in the Supreme Court's reaffirmation in Sakraida of the standards for
patentability on which Kodak and its advisers had relied in making judgments
about the Polaroid patents, standards that at the time had been consistently
applied in the United States for about 130 years.2 9 And no one at Kodak or
elsewhere expected Congress to ignore the Hruska Report and create a specialist
patent appeals court that would ignore over a century of legal precedent when it
began its work.
When the Federal Circuit came into existence in 1982, notwithstanding
assurances to the contrary and without acknowledging it had done so, the Court
almost immediately lowered the standards for patentability.3" By 1985, when the
district court finally decided Polaroid, the Federal Circuit had made it abundantly
clear that the best way for district court judges to avoid reversal and remand in
patent cases was to find patents valid and infringed.3' Unfortunately for Kodak,
the Supreme Court did not get around to attempting to reinstate the prior law
until 2007, twenty-two years after the liability decision in Polaroid.32
Sch. of Gov't, Working Paper No. RWP07-042), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963136.
27 COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS. STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) [hereinafter HRUSKA
COMMISSION REPORT]. This Commission is frequently referred to as the Hruska Commission for
Senator Roman Hruska, who chaired the Commission, and the report is frequently referred to as the
Hruska Commission Report.
' See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, 425 U.S. 273 (1976) (reversing the Fifth Circuit and holding patent
invalid for obviousness).
2 Graham, 383 U.S. at 3-4. In Graham the Court concluded that 35 U.S.C. § 103, enacted
in 1952 and establishing nonobviousness as a condition for patentability, was intended as merely a
codification of judicial precedents embracing the condition for patentability set out by the Court
in 1851 in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850) and consistently followed since then. As
of 1982, the year the Federal Circuit came into existence, that condition for patentability had
prevailed in the United States for 131 years (1851-1982).
3 See Scherer, supra note 26, at 26-27 (discussing dramatic changes to Federal Circuit patent law
despite assurances to the contrary).
31 The impact of the Federal Circuit on district court decisions is analyzed in Matthew D. Henry
& John L. Turner, The Court ofAppealsfor the Federal Circuit's Impact on Patent Liigation, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 85 (2006). Figure 1 of this Article illustrates the dramatic changes that immediately followed
establishment of the Federal Circuit. Id. at 108. The Federal Circuit opinion affirming the district
court in Polaroid did not mention Sakraida.
32 See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1745-46 (2007) (holding that patent was
invalid as obvious).
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Kodak's conduct does not really fit into the authors' "inadvertent
infringement" box. There was nothing "inadvertent" about Kodak's conduct.
The results were certainly unanticipated and unintended, but they were not a
result of inadvertence or lack of care.33
Chapter four discusses historical evidence concerning the role of patents in the
industrial revolution in Britain.'" The discussion is at best ambiguous. We know
that the industrial revolution occurred to the eventual benefit of us all. But the
scholarship discussed by the authors regarding the role of patents in the industrial
revolution is equivocal, and at least some of it may suggest that patents
contributed little or nothing to the industrial revolution. It also seems to suggest
that the industrial revolution may have occurred despite-rather than because
of-the British patent system as it existed at the time.3"
In chapter five the authors posit two methodologies for estimating the value
of patents to their owners. To their credit, they distinguish between the value of
inventions and the value of patents.36 The value of patents arises from the ability
to exclude others from practicing the patented invention which, even in the
absence of a complete monopoly, may enable the patentee or its licensees to earn
enhanced profits.37 However, the authors do not note that the ability to charge
a higher price and thereby garner enhanced profits depends, at least in the case of
patented products, on the patent monopolist's ability to restrict the quantity of
the patented goods supplied to the market. Thus, in such cases, consumers get
less and pay more, which is the price consumers pay for whatever value they may
derive from the patent system.
The first of their valuation methodologies uses United States patent renewal
data to estimate patent value for United States patents.3" The authors also report
substantial work by others who have employed the same methodology to estimate
patent values for non-domestic patents.39 I have two concerns about this
methodology that should be noted.' The first is that renewed patents which are
33 Judge Mazzone, in his decision on Polaroid's damages daim, characterized Kodak's patent
clearance process with respect to Polaroid's patents as a "model for what the law requires." Polaroid
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1538 (D. Mass. 1990).
34 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 77-79.
" See id at 77 (discussing Mokyr's skepticism about the significance of patents for the British
Industrial Revolution).
36 Id. at 98, 106-09.
37 Id. at 97.
" Id. at 99.
39 Id. at 101-02.
4 My concerns are based on my layman's understanding of the methodology, not a critique of
the complex econometric calculations. Detailed analyses and calculations are set forth in Bessen's
working paper, James E. Bessen, The Value of U.S. Patents by Owner and Patent Charaterisics (B.U.
10
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perhaps worth millions of dollars apparently are valued only at their renewal cost,
the same as those that were worth only the renewal cost. Although I suspect
there are not very many patents that are worth millions, the methodology may
understate patent values to the extent there are patents with such values.
The other concern, which tends in the other direction, is that the accuracy of
this method, whether applied to domestic patents or to foreign patents, depends
heavily on the quality of the renewal decisions that underlie the analysis. My
suspicion, based on experience from long, long ago, is that such decisions are
frequently of low quality and often result in the renewal of many patents that are
in fact worthless. When I was a young staff assistant for licensing in Kodak's
chemicals division, my boss at the time, our manager of licensing, became
concerned that our foreign filing and renewal expenses were out of control,
perhaps because they ended up on his budget. The decisions at the time were
typically made by the patent attorneys who had prepared the applications,
frequently in consultation with the inventors, and mostly based on their collective
judgment of how "good" the inventions were. Not surprisingly, neither the
inventors nor the attorneys who had filed the applications ever thought their work
was less than good. Good inventions were typically filed and renewed in five or
more countries in addition to the United States, and really good inventions were
filed in a dozen countries or more and invariably ended up being renewed.
My boss established a foreign filing review group that included himself, the
division director of the research laboratories division where the invention
originated, a senior manager from our international business group, and the
manager for the patent staff that had filed the application. The review group met
monthly to make foreign filing and foreign renewal decisions. The questions they
asked of themselves were whether we would use or sell the invention abroad, or
whether our foreign competitors might use the invention abroad to compete with
us, and, if so, in which countries? They also asked whether there was any realistic
possibility that the invention could be licensed to others abroad for money.
Whether the invention was good or not was irrelevant. The result was that our
foreign filing and renewal expenses were reduced by around fifty percent. If our
experience is typical, estimates of patent value based on renewal data are likely
inflated, perhaps by as much as fifty percent as well.
The other methodology depends on identifying stock market values for a
number of companies, subtracting the values of the identifiable tangible assets to
ascertain values for the intangible assets, and then subtracting the value of the
intangible assets, other than patents, to obtain stock market values attributable to
School of Law Working Paper Series, Law and Economics, Paper No. 06-46, 2006), availabk at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2006.html.
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patents.4' Then I gather that the aggregate patent value estimate is divided by the
number of patents to get the average individual patent value. If the value of the
tangible assets is misvalued or the value of the other intangibles is not removed
or is underestimated, then these numbers may overstate patent values.
Another point that should be made about this methodology is illustrated by
a company like Coca-Cola (Coke) that has substantial stock market value but few
tangible assets. Several years ago, Coke went to great lengths to transfer its
bottling assets to a company called Coca-Cola Enterprises, which is only partially
owned by Coke, to get assets off the Coca-Cola balance sheet so as to enhance
Coke's apparent return on assets.42 Notwithstanding the famous "formula in a
bank vault" legend, Coke's value is largely attributable to its marketing skills and
it owns very few patents.43 In Coke's case, the numerator, the value of the
intangibles, is large. The denominator, the number of patents, is small. The likely
result if Coke's other intangibles, for example, its marketing skills, are undervalued
is a very high value per patent, which cannot be right. To the extent the analyzed
samples include companies like Coca-Cola, the results may well be skewed to the
high side. The authors treat both valuation methodologies as yielding estimates
of upper bound values.' The point of the foregoing is that the estimates are very
much that, and in fact may well be even more highly inflated than the book
implies.
This same chapter also includes a discussion called "Patent Value Across
Groups and Time" that perpetuates the pharmaceutical/chemical patent
confusion and states that "patents held by chemical firms are much more valuable
than those held by other firms."" I would have believed this statement had the
authors said patents held by pharmaceutical firms are more valuable. But there
is no reason of which I am aware to believe that patents held by chemical firms
should be more valuable than those held by other firms, pharmaceuticals
41 It is unclear to me from the text, and from the underlying study by one of the authors, how
the values of intangible assets other than patents are quantified and then deducted to yield an
estimate of aggregate patent values. As with the other valuation methodology, my comments are
based on my layman's understanding of the methodology and are not a critique of the complex
econometric calculations. Detailed analyses and calculations are set forth in Bessen's working paper.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
42 See HAROLD SALTZMAN, ROY LEVY &JOHN C. HILKE, TRANSFORMATION AND CONTINIrTY:
THE U.S. CARBONATED SOFT DRINK BOTTING INDUSTRY AND ANTITRUST PoLIcY SINcE 1980,
at 11-12 (1999) (discussing bottler consolidations).
' See Stephen R. Bard & Jason G. Cummins, The Stock Market and Investment in the New Economy:
Some Tangible Facts and Intangible Fictions, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 65 (2000)
(discussing Coke's intangible assets).
4BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 108-09.
41 Id. at 106.
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excepted. Perhaps this is just more data confusion, but it certainly emphasizes the
importance in future analyses of distinguishing between chemical firms and
pharmaceutical firms. Perhaps that distinction is made in the same section which
states, "Over one-half of the value of world wide patents accrues to a small
number of large pharmaceutical firms; over two-thirds accrues to firms in the
chemical and pharmaceutical industries."'4 This may mean that about sixteen to
seventeen percent of the value of world wide patents accrues to chemical firms.
That still strikes me as being too high. But who knows.
Moreover, there is a discussion of the costs of litigation, and I would volunteer
another data point.47 Although Polaroid sought to recover its attorney fees in its
litigation against Kodak, it did not. But to simplify the litigation, Kodak's
attorneys examined Polaroid's billings and stipulated to an agreed amount if the
court ruled Polaroid was entitled to its attorney fees. The agreed amount was
filed under seal with the court in the expectation it would never see the light of
day if the court ruled that Polaroid was not entitled to recover its attorney fees.
That was the ruling.4" But for reasons of his own, perhaps to frighten potential
litigants about the enormous expense of patent litigation, Judge Mazzone
published the amount in his damages opinion.49 It was $48 million.
The authors also present data from event studies by them and others about
the effects of patent litigation on stock value and conclude, based on results
presented in Table 6.2, that "[t]he combined wealth of the two sides to the lawsuit
decreases."5 ° The Polaroid litigation was an exception. Dr. Paula Demasi, in her
Ph.D. thesis in economics at Harvard, performed and reported event studies for
a sequence of events in the Polaroid-Kodak saga, commencing with Kodak's
announcement that it was conducting R&D on instant photography through the
announcement of a $909.5 million judgment against Kodak in 1990.51 The
46 Id. at 109.
7 Id. at 132.
4 Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1540 (D. Mass. 1990).
49 Id. at 1539.
50 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 137.
51 Paula Demasi, Essays on the Effects of Pubic Pok~y 50 (May, 1991) (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
University, Department of Economics, published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor,
Michigan). The judgment was later reduced to $873.1 million ($437.5 million damages and $435.6
million prejudgment interest). Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1711
(D. Mass. 1991). The award combined lost profits and reasonable royalty damages and therefore
overcompensated Polaroid. Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Senior Advisor, Putnam, Hayes & Bartlett,
Innovation and the United States Patent System Today, Address at ABA Program: Antitrust And
Intellectual Property (Oct. 19,1992), available at http://researchoninnovation.org/quillen/Innovati
on(ABA1992).pdf. A compensatory damages award would have amounted to about $200 million,
based on a reasonable royalty on all of Kodak's sales at the five percent rate the judge said would
have been acceptable to Polaroid. Id.
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combined change in stock value for the litigation events was +$721 million at one
day after the event, -$45 million at two days, and +$380 million at five days. 2 For
Kodak alone, these values were +$953 million, +$141 million, and +$772 million,
respectively.5 3 Polaroid's was negative; its shareholders had lost $392 million as
of the fifth day. Winning does have its price.
The authors take up the topic of patent examination quality in chapter seven. 4
Patent examination quality is only one facet of the more general topic of patent
quality and the need to improve it. The term patent quality is frequently used
without any clear understanding of what is meant by the term. There are at least
two possible meanings, and it is important to understand which definition one is
talking about before taking up the question of policy remedies to improve patent
quality.
Patent examination quality, which is one of the two meanings, is applied to
patents coming out of the PTO and frequently invokes the notion that there is
relevant prior art that was unknown to the PTO, or that the PTO otherwise failed
to apply proper legal standards and that the patent is therefore invalid.
Presumably this kind of lack of quality will be discovered if the patent is litigated
to a conclusion. The real evil is that so long as the invalid patent remains in
existence, it is a cloud on innovation and a possible instrument for extortion,
particularly given the excessive damages awards and uncertainty as to outcomes
that characterize Federal Circuit patent law. Innovators accused of infringement
of such patents frequently find it safer to settle and pay the extortionist rather
than stick it out and face the risk of a crippling damages award, even if they
believe they should win in the end.
The other kind of patent quality has to do with patents on obvious inventions
that are nonetheless valid under the Federal Circuit's lowered and less certain
standards for patentability that exist today, or at least that existed before the
Supreme Court's KSR decision. 5 These patents claim inventions that are no
more than routine applications of textbook principles of science or engineering,
sometimes in combination with each other, and which achieve no new or
unexpected result. They effectively withdraw knowledge from the public domain
and make it unavailable for use by innovators. The patent in Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. that went to the Supreme Court on the doctrine of
equivalents is just such a patent.5 6 The patent was for the use of a commercially
52 Demasi, smpra note 51. These values were obtained by combining the values for the liability
events and the damages events on pages 45 and 54, respectively, of the Demasi thesis.
53Id.
54 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 160-64.
" KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
56 Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
14
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol16/iss1/4
J. INTELL PROP. L[
available filter to filter, and the thought that it could be the subject of a valid
patent mocks the notion of a person of ordinary skill.17  The authors are
extraordinarily generous in their statement that the parties independently
"invented" an improved process for purifying dye."5 Any semi-competent
chemical engineer faced with the problem allegedly solved by this patent would
have arrived at the same solution. And if they failed to do so, they should have
been fired.
Of these two types of "patent quality" deficiencies, the latter is a far more
serious impediment to innovation in the United States than the former, which,
after all, can be dealt with by courageous innovators who are willing to stick it out
through litigation. But for the second type of quality deficiencies, courageous
innovators who stick it out will be found to be infringers of valid patents and face
the possibility of an injunction and excessive damages. Furthermore, policy
remedies aimed at the former, such as increased funding for the PTO, the
establishment of post-grant oppositions, or other changes at the PTO will have
no effect on the latter more serious quality issue that can be dealt with only by
fixing the Federal Circuit problem.
Individual inventors are discussed in chapter eight, and the relative decline in
individual invention beginning near the end of the nineteenth century is noted.5 9
Not mentioned in this regard is the establishment in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries in America and elsewhere of organized industrial research
laboratories that employed educated scientists and engineers. The Kodak
Research Laboratories were established in 1912.6° George Eastman's inspiration
to establish a research lab stemmed from a visit to Bayer's research laboratories
in Germany that already employed 700 people.61 The Bayer labs probably
accounted, at least to some extent, for Germany's preeminence in the synthetic
dyestuffs business in the years that preceded World War I. And the Kodak Labs
were not the first organized industrial research lab in the U.S. 6 2 So perhaps what
-' Id. at 21-23.
8 BESsEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 61.
s9 Id. at 169.
60 DOUGLAS COLLINs, THE STORY OF KODAK 116-17 (1990).
61 Id. at 115.
62 See Steven Cherensky, A Penny For Their Thoughts: Employee Inventors, Preinvention Assignment
Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REv. 597, 608-09 (1993) (giving early examples of
industrial laboratories).
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is being observed is not the decline of individual inventors,63 but rather the rise
of organized industrial research. 64
In the discussion of a study by Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, who found that
only sixty-one percent of patentees who wanted to license their patents were able
to do so, the authors state, "[t]his suggests a significant market failure." ' Hardly!
What it suggests is wishful thinking by the thirty-nine percent of the patentees
who owned patents for which no one else had any use. Sixty-one percent is an
astonishingly high percentage, particularly given estimates by some that only about
five percent of U.S. patents are ever employed commercially. So the sixty-one
percent figure suggests, if anything, an unusually useful group of patents, and a
highly efficient market. The whole thrust of this particular section is to suggest
that technology markets are inefficient and that it is difficult for small inventors
to realize as much value from their patents as large firms do.66 The other
explanation, which I think more plausible, is that technology markets are highly
efficient and that the offerings by small inventors are less useful and valuable than
those by large firms.
Chapter nine discusses software and business method patents, and I really do
not think I can add anything of substance. But I would like to add one
observation and one "war story" from my childhood. As to the observation, it
strikes me that the extension of patent eligible subject matter to software and
business methods was judicial legislation, pure and simple. Like most judicial
legislation, it was done without any inquiry into the facts, specifically with
reference to the software and financial services industries as to whether either
industry was suffering from a lack of innovation, and, if so, whether either would
benefit from having the costs of the patent system imposed on it. It seemed to
me at the time that neither was suffering. At Kodak our treasurer's days were
filled with visits from investment bankers, all of whom had some new financing
63 The authors' discussion of the Lemelson saga is overly generous to Lemelson to the extent
it implies he invented the "breakthrough" technologies against which his patents were asserted.
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 170. He did not! These technologies were developed by those
accused of infringement or their suppliers. Few, if any, of them were breakthrough technologies.
And his patents, or at least some of them, were ruled invalid when one of his victims decided to
fight rather than settle. See, e.g., Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research
Found., 422 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
64 See WILLIAMJ. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE (2002) (stressing the
importance of routinized R&D by large firms (oligopolies) as the source of growth in competitive
western economies).
65 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 181 (citing Alfonso Gambardella, Paola Giuri &
Alessandra Luzzi, The Market for Patents in Europe (Lab. of Econ. & Mgmt. Working Paper
No. 2006/04), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=899539).
66 Id. at 177.
16
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol16/iss1/4
J. RNTELL PROP. L
scheme in which they thought we might have an interest. My knowledge of the
software business is less direct. But my visits to computer stores, a wholly new
creature, surely left me with the impression that the packaged software business
was flourishing.
As for the "war story," I grew up in a small town in southwest Virginia before
the advent of supermarkets, and our grocer's store was a short walk from our
house. I would frequently be sent to the store to buy something, sometimes
tobacco for my grandfather. Mr. Snodgrass, our grocer, would recognize me
when I entered the store, and when I told him what I was sent to purchase, he
would tell me the brand I should get, hand the item to me, and charge it to my
grandmother's account. Now I have never read the famous "one click" patent;
but the descriptions I have read sound a lot like what Mr. Snodgrass did in my
childhood. And, one might wonder what is inventive about doing by computer
something that was undoubtedly done by every storekeeper many years ago.
In the next chapter, the authors refer to the "twinning" study by Stuart
Graham and Dietmar Harhoff that quantifies savings to be had if litigated United
States patents for which counterpart applications were denied at the European
Patent Office (EPO) could be eliminated by United States opposition.67 This
conclusion depends on an implicit assumption that the standards for patentability
that would be applied in the United States opposition would be the same as the
standards at the EPO. Elsewhere in the book they cite to work by Paul Jensen
and others who conclude that United States standards are substantially lower than
those of Europe and Japan.68 Given that fact, it is doubtful that the desired
savings could be realized in the absence of an increase in the standards for
patentability in the United States. And if that should happen, then the PTO's
examination process might well weed out such patents, and oppositions could be
rendered unnecessary. So I share the authors' lack of enthusiasm for oppositions,
but for reasons far more profound than "poor patent notice."
I suspect it is only because of the staleness of my knowledge of foreign
practices, but I am puzzled by the statement that "the patent courts in Japan,
Germany, and the United Kingdom all rely to some extent on their respective
patent offices for help in claim interpretation."69 I just don't know what help the
respective patent offices provide to the courts, or how it might be used or useful
in a contested proceeding.
67 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 224; Graham & Harhoff, supra note 10.
' Jensen et al., spra note 10, at 698.
69 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 227.
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The authors raise the specter of the persistence of forum shopping and cite
papers by Judge Moore and by Atkinson, Marco, and Turner.7' They also state:
"But a decline in forum shopping does not mean much if the parties shop less
because they will face equally uncertain patent law in every possible forum. The
important question is whether the Federal Circuit made patent law more
predictable. Certainly, claim interpretation has not been predictable.7 M
I emphatically agree that the authors' question is the important one. And their
answer is certainly correct. It is also correct as to the obviousness/nonobviousness
question because of the uncertainties mandated by Federal Circuit law. I will have
more to say about forum shopping later, in connection with my own reform
proposals.72 The authors also state: "It is certainly true that appeals courts had
different interpretations of patent law before the Federal Circuit was
created... ."" That statement is, I think, mostly incorrect, although it was put
forward by the proponents of creating the Federal Circuit. I will have more to say
about this later as well.74
The discussion regarding trade secrets implies a choice between trade secret
protection and patent protection, which is very much the conventional wisdom.7"
That choice simply does not exist for innovators concerned for the commercial
use of their inventions. Trade secret law protects only against unauthorized
disclosure by one who has a confidential relationship with the owner of the trade
secret.76 Others are free to discover the trade secret by independent development,
reverse engineering, or other legitimate means, and to disclose it or use it as they
see fit.77 And such others may even obtain a patent on the trade secret and
possibly prevent its use by the original developer.78 At Kodak, we had come to
the conclusion that the latter risk (i.e., the risk of being precluded from using our
own work because of patenting by a subsequent inventor), was so great that we
regularly sought to preempt others from obtaining such patents by seeking
patents for our patentable process inventions we expected to use commercially,
even if they could be practiced in secret.
70 Id. at 228.
7 Id.
72 See infra pp. 76-77.
13 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 231.
14 See infra pp. 75-76.
1s BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 232-33.
76 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. B (1939).
77 Id.
71 See Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623, 629 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[A] third party's valid reverse
engineering of the item can destroy the item's trade secret protection.").
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The semi-final chapter in the book gives the authors' proposals for reform.79
Many of the reforms proposed are no more than wishful thinking without
concrete proposals, and some might even move the ball backwards. An example
of the latter is their proposal for specialized patent trial courts.'s In the absence
of more fundamental changes to simplify and reform patent law, such courts will
simply perpetuate and perhaps aggravate the current situation. Moreover, they
will be subject to the same temptation to be a "booster of its specialty" that has
gripped the Federal Circuit."' The better solution is simplification and reform of
the United States patent laws.82 If that is done, the regular courts with their
broader perspective should have no difficulty in dealing with patent cases.
Regarding the role of the Patent Office, the authors state that: "Claim
meaning ... in the main depend[s] upon the information contained in the
documents prepared by the Patent Office-, namely, the patent - with its claim language,
drawings, and written description.... . 83 These documents are not prepared by
the Patent Office. They are all prepared by the applicant. I do, however, agree
with their suggestion that reinvigoration of the definiteness requirement would
be a good thing.' And their suggestion that claims with multiple possible
interpretations should be invalid for indefiniteness is right on the money.85
Perhaps courts need to resurrect the contract theory of patents and then apply the
classic rule of contract construction that ambiguities are to be construed against
the drafter (i.e., the patentee) in the case of patents. If these two changes were
made (i.e., reinvigoration of the definiteness requirement and resolution of claim
ambiguities against the patentee), applicants (and their attorneys) might be far
more careful in preparing their patent documents.
Advisory opinions from the PTO should be a non-starter."6 The other federal
agencies mentioned (the SEC and IRS) do not provide advisory opinions. Rather
they issue no-action letters (business review letters in the case of the Department
of'Justice Antitrust Division) indicating that the agency will not take action against
proposed conduct."7 They do not express a view on issues in a private dispute.
7' BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 235-53.
o Id at 238.
81 Declan McCu~lah, Left Gets Nod fom Right on Copyright Law, CNET NEWS, Nov. 20, 2002,
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-966595.html.
82 See Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Proposal for the Simplficaion and Reform of the United States Patent
System, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 189,206 n.69 (1994) (addressing the question of specialist patent trial courts).
83 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 238 (emphasis added).
84 Id. at 239.
85 Id
8 Id at 241-42.
7 See Donna M. Nagy,JudicialRe'ance on Regulatory Interpretations in SECNo-Action Letters: Current
Probems anda Proposed Framework, 83 CoRNELLL. REV. 921,929 (1998) (explaining SEC's no-action
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Also, a higher nonobviousness standard would be a good thing,88 but wishing for
it does not provide a mechanism for getting there, nor for assuring it is applied
by the courts and at the PTO.
IV. PATENT REFORMS TO FOSTER INNOVATION
A. THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS
There are two, and only two, really, important reforms that should be adopted
promptly. Together they address both types of patent quality issues discussed by
the authors: namely, patent quality in the courts (i.e., valid patents on obvious
inventions) and quality at the PTO. Everything else can wait, and many of the
remaining issues may be resolved by the two key reforms.
The first of the fundamental reforms is that we should restore to patent law
a self-correcting structure like that which applies to most other areas of federal
law. In that structure, appeals from a district court are heard by the regular court
of appeals for the region in which the district court is located. All courts can
make mistakes, but with such a structure, when the issue arises in another circuit,
the courts in that other circuit are free to reconsider the issue on its merits and are
not constrained by stare decisis. The result is that most errors are quickly purged
from the system, and those that persist are frequently the sign of serious policy
issues that deserve Supreme Court attention. Our patent system does not work
that way. The Federal Circuit has a monopoly on all appeals, and when it makes
a mistake, the PTO and the district courts are locked in by stare decisis and have
no choice but to follow the mistaken policy promulgated by the Federal Circuit.
The mistakes persist for a very long time. The Supreme Court has only recently
attempted to correct Federal Circuit errors that have persisted for twenty-five
years.
8 9
This problem can be remedied by adoption of the Nard-Duffy proposal for
parallel appellate tracks for patent appeals, 9° or by restoring appellate jurisdiction
letter process).
88 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 248.
'9 See, e.g., Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193,208 (2005); Unitherm Food
Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 406 (2006); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 393 (2006); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28,45 (2006); MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007);
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
90 See Craig Allen Nard &John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Unformioy Pnncipk, 101 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1619 (2007) (recommending establishment of parallel appellate tracks for patent cases).
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in patent infringement cases to the regular courts of appeals.9' Either proposal
has the virtue of exposing questions of patent law and policy to judges who have
a far broader and deeper background of legal and judicial experience than the
typical Federal Circuit judge, and who therefore may have an appreciation for
policy nuances affecting innovation that might not occur to the Federal Circuit.
Adopting either of these proposals should go a long way toward assuring that the
higher standards the Supreme Court has recently sought to restore are followed
in the courts and not evaded. That, in turn, should somewhat diminish the need
for innovators to seek defensive patent protection and reduce, to some extent, the
current flood of patent applications and patents that clog the system.
When I have urged this proposal in the past, I have sometimes been met with
the response: "Oh, we couldn't do that. It would bring back the mess that
existed before the Federal Circuit came along." That "mess" existed mostly in the
propaganda of the proponents of the Federal Circuit who, for the most part, were
corporate and Washington patent attorneys whose jobs and incomes were
threatened by the possibility of applying the standards of the Supreme Court and
the regular courts of appeals at the PTO and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals.92 The mess was not apparent to the attorneys who actually litigated
patent cases, most of whom opposed formation of the Federal Circuit.93
Even the authors appear to have been seduced by the propaganda when they
state, "It is certainly true that appeals courts had different interpretations of
patent law before the Federal Circuit was created ... .,"' That statement, as I
previously noted, is mostly incorrect.9  It is my recollection that the
"interpretations" of patent law by the regular courts of appeals were largely the
same and were consistent with Supreme Court law. As to forum shopping, the
authors cite the work by Atkinson, Turner, and Marco who claim to have
91 See Quillen, supra note 2, at 233.
92 See id. at 226-29 (countering the proponent's arguments for the Federal Circuit's
establishment).
93 See DanielJ. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit: A PersonalAccount, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 581,610
(1992) (noting that almost all of the letters received at the Office for Improvements in the
Administration ofJustice (OIAJ) from patent trial attorneys opposed creation of the Federal Circuit,
whereas almost all from corporate patent attorneys were favorable and referencing Mr. Meador, who
headed the OIAJ while on leave from the University of Virginia Law School).
94 BESSEN & MEuRER, supra note 1, at 231.
5 Only twenty-eight percent of the respondents to a survey conducted by the patent consultants
to the Hruska Commission thought differences in interpretation of law were a problem. HRUSKA
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 27, at 390. Only forty-eight percent thought that circuit conflicts
due to differences in the application of the law was a cause of considerable impact on patent
disputes. Id. The survey was circulated to only 1,400 attorneys and only about 240 usable responses
were received. Id. at 369.
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quantified the amount of forum shopping that occurred prior to and after
formation of the Federal Circuit.96 Their analysis, if I understand it, implicitly
depends on the unverified and perhaps unverifiable assumption that patentees
could have always sued in their home districts and would have preferred to do so.
These are heroic assumptions that assure forum shopping will always be found
in their analysis. Venue and personal jurisdiction requirements were such that
patentees could sue only where the alleged infringer was incorporated or in
venues where an act of infringement had occurred and the alleged infringer had
a regular and established place of business.9 7 These requirements were strictly
enforced in pre-Federal Circuit days, and patentees had little opportunity to forum
shop.9 It was probably a rare coincidence when the patentee's home district was
a venue in which he or she could bring suit. Declaratory judgment plaintiffs,
however, had more latitude. They could bring an action wherever personal
jurisdiction over the patentee existed, provided, of course, that the requisite
controversy existed. 99
Perhaps the answer is in Paul Janicke's history that was published in the
AntitrustLawJournal.'0° Janicke's article notes that the forum shopping claim was
based on a very limited survey by two Federal Circuit proponents that elicited few
responses, and that the real concern of the Federal Circuit proponents was the
Supreme Court, and not forum shopping or the other reasons given.' That is
certainly consistent with my recollection.
0 2
The second of the fundamental reforms is to enable the PTO to obtain final
decisions as to the patentability of applications it has examined. This can be done
96 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 228 (citing Scott Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John L.
Turner, The Economics of a CentrakiZedJudiiagy: Uniformiy, Forum Shopping and the FederalCircuit, http://
www.terry.uga.edu/-jltumer/ForumShoppingMay2008.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2008)).
97 Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79
N.C. L. REv. 889, 895--96 (2001).
98 Id.
99 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2007). Strangely, the authors found forum shopping by declaratory
judgment plaintiffs who initiated lawsuits to challenge patents to be less likely. BESSEN & MEURER,
supra note 1, at 18.
" Paul Janicke, To Be or Not To Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (2001).
101 Id. at 647, 653-54.
'02 The time prior to the advent of the Federal Circuit was somewhat of a "golden age" for
innovators. Although the PTO, under the judicial supervision of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA), persisted in issuing patents that did not conform to applicable legal standards, the
federal district courts and courts of appeals regularly protected innovators from harm by patents that
should never have been issued by applying the Supreme Court's higher standards for patentability
and finding such patents invalid. See KOENIG, supra note 21, at 4-23 (indicating a 65.7% invalidity
rate).
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by abolishing all forms of continuing patent applications except for divisional
applications filed pursuant to a 35 U.S.C. § 121 requirement for restriction."°3 At
the moment, patent applicants can avoid such final decisions and restart the
examination process simply by refiling their applications as continuation or
continuation-in-part applications, or by a request for continued examination
(RCE). The problem is aggravated by PTO management policies that favor the
filing of such continuing applications. The PTO's examiner compensation system
rates examiner performance based on the number of "first office actions" and
"disposals."'" Every continuing application or RCE results in a disposal, and the
refiled application requires a first office action, and promises another disposal."s
Thus PTO policy rewards examiners for inducing the filing of continuing
applications. PTO management is schizophrenic on the issue. It has proposed
a rule, which the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has found
to be beyond its authority,"°' to slightly limit the number of continuing
applications, °7 but continues its management policy of favoring their filing by
maintaining the compensation system that rewards examiners for inducing their
filing. Such are the ways of a federal bureaucracy.
In addition to enabling the PTO to obtain final decisions as to the
patentability of applications it has examined, such abolition would permit the
PTO to apply the resources now devoted to the examination of such continuing
applications (currently about thirty percent of applications filed at the PTO)"'5 to
the examination of original applications, which should enhance patent quality. As
103 This proposal was put forward by the author at the Patent Quality Conference sponsored by
the Intellectual Property Owners Association in 2004. The text of the author's presentation can be
found at Cecil Quillen, Abolish Continuing Patent Applications?, Presentation at the Patent Quality
Conference of the Intellectual Property Owners Association (Apr. 19, 2004), availabk at http://
www.researchoninnovation.org/quien/Abolish%20Continuing%/ 2OAppications%/20(IP 0 / 20 2
004).pdf.
104 See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 63, 74 & n.38 (2004) (discussing examiner incentive system).
1o' See id at n.38; Just a Patent Examiner, http://just-n-examiner.ivejoumal.com
(Sept. 22, 2008, 22:22 EST) ("Every time an applicant files a RCE (or a straight continuation), the
examiner receives a count for the express abandonment, and another count for the first action after
the RCE.").
106 Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va. 2008).
107 See PTO, Questions and Answers for the Record, United States Patent and Trademark Office
Oversight Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary Sub-comm. on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.nipra.org/DudasRsp2.pdf ("The
limitations proposed in the continuations rule were assumed to result in a 1% reduction of
application received....").
108 See PTO, PERFORMANCE ANDAccOUNTABLITY REPORT: FISCALYEAR2007, at68, availabk
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2007/2007annualreport.pdf.
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to divisional applications, they should be required to be filed promptly after the
requirement for restriction is made final.
Both of these changes are likely to be bitterly opposed by the organized patent
bar and by their adherents and captives (the "patent crowd"). After all, it is their
pocketbooks that will be affected. But if we want a patent system that serves
innovation and American consumers rather than the interests of the attorneys
who participate in the system, we need to adopt both of these proposals. The
positions taken by the organized patent bar and their adherents and captives will
provide a litmus test of whether they place their own interests ahead of
innovation in the United States and the public interest.
B. THE SECONDARY AND TERTIARY REFORMS
There are a number of secondary items that are candidates for reform. But we
should not take them up until the two key reforms, discussed above, have been
enacted and given time to operate. For example, the bitter debate over patent
damages that is part of the current reform squabble could go away if the first
proposal above is adopted and damages issues are presented to appellate judges
who have actually tried a civil suit to conclusion, either as attorneys or judges, and
who therefore have some practical knowledge of damages issues.
Similarly the so-called secondary factors, which the Federal Circuit has
mandated for consideration in every case,10 9 and which has made patent litigation
more complicated and expensive and outcomes less predictable, could be returned
to their prior status of conditional relevance." Even then it would be better if
they were to be abolished entirely, and that would require legislation. The
doctrine of equivalents, which is patent law's "catch 22" that makes infringers out
of innovators who have successfully designed around a patent's claims, is another
source of unnecessary uncertainty that adds expense and complication to patent
evaluations and patent litigation and that should be abolished. This will require
legislation.
109 Compare Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Proposalfor the Simpification and Reform of the United States Patent
System, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 189 nn.15-16 (discussing elevation of searching factors by court of appeals),
with A. Samuel Oddi, Bfyond Obviousness: Innovation Protection in the Twenty-First Centugy, 38 AM. U. L.
REv. 1097, 1123-26 (1989) (discussing the Supreme Court's finding that secondary factors alone do
not satisfy patent requirements).
11 And such experienced judges could well restore preponderance of the evidence as the
applicable evidentiary standard for the 35 U.S.C. § 282 presumption of validity rather than the
Federal Circuit's clear and convincing evidence test.
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We should also enact a "prior independent inventor" defense, similar in many
respects to the prior user rights defense that has been discussed,"' to the effect
that an affirmative defense to an infringement charge is actual reduction to
practice of the accused device or process by the accused infringer prior to the
publication date of the patent he or she is accused of infringing (i.e., independent
prior invention by the defendant). This should assure innovators the right to use
their own prior independent inventions free and clear of the claims of subsequent
inventors and reduce the pressure on innovators to file defensive patent
applications on marginal inventions. It may also help reduce the patent and
application flood. It should appeal to patent owners, as the validity of their
patents would not be placed in issue by such a defense. We should furthermore
adopt one more affirmative noninfringement defense to the effect that there is no
infringement if the accused device, process, etc., is obvious in view of prior art to
the asserted patent and published applications or patents filed prior to the filing
date of the asserted patent. This, too, should appeal to patent owners because,
as with the prior independent invention defense, the validity of their patents
would not be placed in issue by the defense.
There are some tertiary items, consideration of which should be postponed
until well after the primary and secondary items have been adopted so as to avoid
having to deal with too many contentious issues at one time. These include the
question of whether we should adopt a "first-to-file" system, with or without a
grace period for inventors, and whether it is worthwhile to adopt some form of
post-grant opposition system. An important reason for delaying consideration of
the latter is to provide time to see what happens when the self-correcting judicial
structure has been restored to patent law and the federal courts have had time to
implement the restored higher standards for patentability mandated by the
Supreme Court's recent KSR decision, and the PTO has been enabled to obtain
final decisions as to the patentability of applications it has examined and has had
the opportunity to apply the restored standards. It may be that such an expensive
procedure is unnecessary or not worthwhile.
V. CONCLUSION
Bessen and Meurer are right! Our patent system is not working for most
innovators. Nor is it working for American consumers who ultimately bear the
costs our patent system imposes on innovation in the United States and the
... For recent legislative proposals expanding the prior user defense, see Patent Reform Act
of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 4
(2007).
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consequences of those costs. We get less innovation and it costs us more. But
the problems with our patent system are more profound than the failure of patent
notice. And those problems can be resolved only by fundamental reforms that
go beyond the patent notice issues and address the absence of a self-correcting
mechanism in the structure of our federal judicial system as it applies to our
patent system, and the inability of the PTO to obtain final decisions as to the
patentability of applications it has examined. Two reforms should be adopted.
A self-correcting judicial structure for our patent system should be put in place,
either by adopting the Nard/Duffy proposal for parallel appellate tracks, or by
restoring appellate jurisdiction in patent infringement cases to the regular courts
of appeals. And the PTO should be enabled to obtain final decisions as to the
patentability of applications it has examined, which can be done by abolishing all
forms of continuing patent applications except for divisional applications filed
pursuant to a 35 U.S.C. § 121 requirement for restriction. These two fundamental
reforms should be sufficient to point our patent system in the right direction.
And consideration of other reforms should be delayed as many of them could
well become unnecessary as a consequence of implementing these two
fundamental reforms.
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